Abstract. We extend our correspondence between evaluators and abstract machines from the pure setting of the λ-calculus to the impure setting of the computational λ-calculus. We show how to derive new abstract machines from monadic evaluators for the computational λ-calculus. Starting from (1) a generic evaluator parameterized by a monad and (2) a monad specifying a computational effect, we inline the components of the monad in the generic evaluator to obtain an evaluator written in a style that is specific to this computational effect. We then derive the corresponding abstract machine by closure-converting, CPS-transforming, and defunctionalizing this specific evaluator. We illustrate the construction with the identity monad, obtaining yet again the CEK machine, and with a lifted state monad, obtaining a variant of the CEK machine with error and state.
Introduction
Diehl, Hartel, and Sestoft's overview of abstract machines for programming-language implementation [14] concluded on the need to develop a theory of abstract machines. In previous work [2, 9] , we have attempted to contribute to this theory by identifying a correspondence between interpreters (i.e., evaluation functions in the sense of denotational semantics) and abstract machines (i.e., transition functions in the sense of operational semantics). The correspondence builds on the observation that defunctionalized continuation-passing evaluators are abstract machines. It is therefore constructive: to obtain an abstract machine, we start from a compositional evaluator and
We have verified that the correspondence holds for call-by-need evaluators and lazy abstract machines [4] , logic programming [6] , imperative programming, and object-oriented programming, including Featherweight Java and a subset of Smalltalk. We have also constructed generalizations of Krivine's machine and of the CEK machine by starting from normalization functions [1] . The correctness of the abstract machines (resp. of the evaluators) is a corollary of the correctness of the evaluators (resp. of the abstract machines) and of the correctness of the transformations.
In this article, we take a next step by applying the methodology to evaluators and abstract machines for languages with computational effects [5, 27, 33] . We consider a generic evaluator parameterized by a monad (Sections 2 and 3). We then consider two monads: the identity monad (Section 4) and a lifted state monad (Section 5). We inline the components of these monads in the generic evaluator, obtaining two specific evaluators. We then construct the corresponding abstract machines by closure-converting, CPS-transforming, and defunctionalizing these specific evaluators.
We next turn to the security technique of 'stack inspection' [19] . Clements and Felleisen recently debunked the myth that stack inspection is incompatible with proper tail recursion [7] . To this end, they presented an abstract machine implementing stack inspection in a properly tail-recursive way. We characterize Clements and Felleisen's stack inspection as a lifted state monad (Section 6). We then present a monad that accounts for stack inspection more precisely than the lifted state monad, we review related work, and we conclude.
In a preliminary version of this article [3] , we also considered a state monad, an exception monad, and the two possible monads obtained by combining these two monads. We mechanically constructed the corresponding abstract machines.
A call-by-value monadic evaluator in ML
As traditional [5, 17, 33] , we specify a monad as a type constructor and two polymorphic functions.
(We use Standard ML [26] Given a program, the main evaluation function calls eval with this term and the initial environment:
In actuality, this evaluation function, eval, env base, and value are defined in an ML functor parameterized with a structure M : MONAD. Except for the identity monad, each monad comes with operations that need to be integrated in the source language. Rather than systematically extending the syntax of the source language with these operations, we hold some of them in the initial environment. For example, rather than having a special form for the successor function, we define it with a binding in the base environment:
val env_base = Env.extend ("succ", FUN (fn (NUM i) => M.unit (NUM (i + 1))), Env.empty) 3 On using ML as a metalanguage ML is a Turing-complete, statically typed, call-by-value language with computational effects:
-ML programs can therefore diverge and to this end, ML comes with a 'built-in' lifting monad to account for divergence. In Section 2, we implicitly make use of this monad in the codomain of eval: applying eval to a term and an environment only yields a result if it terminates. -Compiling the evaluator of Section 2 yields warnings to the effect that pattern matching, in the clause for APP and in the initial environment, is incomplete. Should we attempt to evaluate a source program that is ill-typed (e.g., because it applies the successor function to a function instead of to an integer), a run-time exception would be raised. In that sense, ML also comes with a 'built-in' error monad to account for pattern-matching errors.
In the remainder of this article, we instantiate the evaluator of Section 2 with monads. We could be pedantic and only consider monads that are layered on top of two lifting monads-one for pattern-matching errors and one for divergence. The result would be a notational overkill, and therefore we choose to use ML's built-in monads.
For the purpose of our work, we view monads as a factorization device for writing evaluators, and we symbolically simplify the monadic evaluator of Section 2 with respect to a given monad (thereby obtaining a direct-style evaluator out of the identity monad, a lifted evaluator out of the lifting monad, a state-threading evaluator out of a state monad, a continuation-passing evaluator out of the continuation monad, an exception-oriented evaluator out of an exception monad, etc.). Our symbolic simplification undoes Moggi's factorization and it is carried out by inlining the definitions of the type constructor, of unit and bind, and of the monadic operations.
We first specify the identity monad and inline its components in the monadic evaluator of Section 2, obtaining an evaluator in direct style. We then take the same steps as in our previous work [2] : closure conversion, CPS transformation, and defunctionalization. The result is Felleisen et al.'s CEK machine extended with literals [16, 18] .
The identity monad
The identity monad is specified with an identity type constructor and the corresponding two polymorphic functions: 
Closure conversion
We defunctionalize the function space in the data type of values. There are two function constructors:
-one in the denotation of lambda-abstractions, which we represent by a closure, pairing the code of lambda-abstractions together with their lexical environment, and -one in the initial environment, which we represent by a specialized constructor SUCC.
We splice these two constructors in the data type of values:
datatype value = NUM of int | CLO of ide * term * value Env.env | SUCC
Closures are produced when interpreting lambda-abstractions, and the successor function is produced in the initial environment. Both are consumed when interpreting applications.
val env_base = Env.extend ("succ", SUCC, Env.empty) (* eval : term * value Env.env -> value *) fun eval (LIT i, e) = NUM i | eval (VAR x, e) = Env.lookup (x, e) | eval (LAM (x, t), e) = CLO (x, t, e) | eval (APP (t0, t1), e) = let val v0 = eval (t0, e) val v1 = eval (t1, e) in case v0 of (CLO (x, t, e)) => eval (t, Env.extend (x, v1, e)) | SUCC => let val (NUM i) = v1 in NUM (i + 1) end end fun main p = eval (p, env_base)
CPS transformation
We materialize the control flow of the evaluator using continuations:
datatype value = NUM of int | CLO of ide * term * value Env.env | SUCC val env_base = Env.extend ("succ", SUCC, Env.empty)
The same evaluator is obtained by inlining the components of the continuation monad in the monadic evaluator of Section 2 and closure-converting the result.
Defunctionalization
We defunctionalize the function space of continuations. There are three function constructors:
-one in the initial continuation, which we represent by a constructor STOP, and -two in the interpretation of applications, one with t1, e, and k as free variables, and one with v0 and k as free variables.
We represent the function space of continuations with a data type with three constructors and an apply function interpreting these constructors. As already noted elsewhere [11, 12] , the data type of defunctionalized continuations coincides with the data type of evaluation contexts for the source language [15, 16] . 
= apply_cont (k, CLO (x, t, e)) | eval (APP (t0, t1), e, k) = eval (t0, e, ARG (t1, e, k)) (* apply_cont : cont * value -> value *) and apply_cont (STOP, v)
This defunctionalized continuation-passing evaluator is an implementation of the CEK machine extended with literals [16, 18] , which we present next.
4.6
The CEK machine -Source syntax (terms): t ::= i | x | λx.t | t 0 t 1 -Expressible values (integers, closures, and predefined functions) and evaluation contexts (i.e., defunctionalized continuations):
-Initial transition, transition rules (two kinds), and final transition:
where e base = e empty [succ → succ] e init = e base
Summary and conclusion
We have presented a series of evaluators and one abstract machine that correspond to a call-byvalue monadic evaluator and the identity monad. The first evaluator is a traditional, Lisp-like one in direct style. The machine is the CEK machine. The correctness of the evaluators and of the abstract machine is a corollary of the correctness of the original monadic evaluator and of the transformations.
From a lifted state monad to an abstract machine
We specify a lifted state monad and inline its components in the monadic evaluator, obtaining an evaluator in state-passing style. Closure converting, CPS-transforming, and defunctionalizing this state-passing evaluator yields a version of the CEK machine with error and state. This monad and this machine form a stepping stone towards stack inspection.
A lifted state monad
We consider a lifted state monad where the state is, for conciseness, one integer. We equip this monad with three operations for reading and writing the state and for failing: Proof. By straightforward equational reasoning. (Alternatively, the lifted state monad is a combination of the lifting monad and of a state monad, and is known to be a monad [27] .)
We extend the base environment with three functions get, set, and fail: val env_init = Env.extend ("fail", FUN (fn _ => fail), Env.extend ("set", FUN (fn (NUM i) => bind (set i, fn i => unit (NUM i))), Env.extend ("get", FUN (fn _ => bind (get, fn i => unit (NUM i))), env_base)))
Evaluation starts with an initial state state init : Lifted State Monad.state.
A CEK machine with error and state
Inlining the components of the lifted state monad in the monadic evaluator of Section 2 and uncurrying the eval function and the function space in the data type of expressible values yields a call-by-value evaluator in state-passing style. As in Section 4, we closure-convert, CPS-transform, and defunctionalize this inlined evaluator. The result is a version of the CEK machine with error and state [15] . The source language and evaluation contexts are as in the CEK machine of Section 4.
-Expressible values (integers, closures, and predefined functions) and results: In case of failure, the machine propagates bottom out of the surrounding evaluation contexts and yields it as the final result. The machine could be optimized by re-classifying the fail -transition to be a final transition (i.e., a transition that directly yields bottom as the result) and by removing all the bottom-propagating transitions. In the corresponding CPS evaluator, this optimization hinges on the type isomorphism between the sum-accepting continuation ((value * state) lift) -> 'a and the pair of continuations (value * state -> 'a) * (unit -> 'a). This isomorphism enables the optimization from unit -> 'a (i.e., a propagating continuation) to 'a (i.e., an immediate stop). We illustrate this optimization in Appendix A.
Summary and conclusion
We have presented a lifted state monad and the abstract machine that corresponds to the call-byvalue monadic evaluator and this monad. The evaluator obtained by inlining the components of the lifted state monad is in state-passing style. The machine is a version of the CEK machine with state and explicit error propagation. The correctness of the evaluators and of the abstract machine is a corollary of the correctness of the original monadic evaluator and of the transformations.
Stack inspection as a lifted state monad
Stack inspection is a security mechanism developed to allow code with different levels of trust to interact in the same execution environment (e.g., the JVM or the CLR) [19] . Before execution, the code is annotated with a subset R of a fixed set of permissions P . For example, trusted code is annotated with all permissions and untrusted code is only annotated with a subset of permissions. Before accessing a restricted resource during execution, the call stack is inspected to test that the required access permissions are available. This test consists of traversing the entire call stack to ensure that the direct caller and all indirect callers all have the required permissions to access the resource. Traversing the entire call stack prevents untrusted code from gaining access to restricted resources by (indirectly) calling trusted code. Trusted code can prevent inspection of its callers for some permissions by explicitly granting those permissions. Trusted code can only grant permissions with which it has been annotated.
Because the entire call stack has to be inspected before accessing resources, the stack-inspection mechanism seems to be incompatible with global tail-call optimization. However, Clements and Felleisen have shown that this is not true and that stack inspection is in fact compatible with global tail-call optimization [7] . Their observation is that the security information of multiple tail calls can be summarized in a permission table. If each stack frame contains a permission table, stack frames do not need to be allocated for tail-calls-the permission table of the current stack frame can be updated instead. This tail-recursive semantics for stack inspection is similar to tail-call optimization in (dynamically scoped) Lisp [29] . It is presented in the form of a CESK machine, the CM machine, and Clements and Felleisen have proved that this machine uses as much space as Clinger's tail-call optimized CESK machine [8] . In the CM machine, the call stack is represented as CEK evaluation contexts enriched with a permission table.
The language of the CM machine is the λ-calculus extended with four constructs:
, to annotate a term t with a set of permissions R. When executed, the permissions available are restricted to the permissions in R by making the complement R = P \ R unavailable; t is then executed with the updated permissions. 2. grant R in t, to grant a set of permissions R during the evaluation of a term t. When executed, the permissions R are made available, and t is executed with the updated permissions. 3. test R then t 0 else t 1 , to branch depending on whether a set of permissions R is available.
When executed, the call stack is inspected using a predicate called OK, and t 0 is executed if the permissions are available; otherwise t 1 is executed. 4. fail, to fail due to a security error. When executed, the evaluation is terminated with a security error (and therefore the machine is optimized as described in Appendix A).
Our starting point is a simplified version of Clements and Felleisen's CM machine. Their machine includes a heap and a garbage-collection rule to make it possible to extend Clinger's spacecomplexity analysis to the CM machine. For simplicity, we leave out the heap and the garbagecollection rule from the machine, and, without loss of generality (because the source language is untyped), we omit recursive functions from the source language. Clements and Felleisen's source language does not have literals; for simplicity, we do likewise and we omit literals and the successor function from the source language. Our focus is the basic stack-inspection mechanism and the features we have omitted from the CM machine do not interfere with this basic mechanism.
-Permissions and permission tables for a fixed set of permissions P : t ⇒ init t, e empty , stop(m empty )
x, e, k ⇒ eval k, e(x) λx.t, e, k ⇒ eval k, [x, t, e] t 0 t 1 , e, k ⇒ eval t 0 , e, arg(t 1 , e, k, m empty )
where m empty denotes the empty permission table,
In the CM machine, evaluation contexts are CEK evaluation contexts enriched with permission tables. They are therefore a zipped version of the CEK evaluation contexts and a stack of permission tables. We unzip the CM evaluation contexts into CEK evaluation contexts and a stack of permission tables. Permissions, permission tables, source syntax, expressible values, and outcomes remain the same as in the original CM machine. The OK predicate is changed to inspect the stack of permission tables instead of the evaluation contexts: -Evaluation contexts:
transition rules (two kinds), and final transitions:
t ⇒ init t, e empty , m empty :: nil , stop
x, e, ms, k ⇒ eval k, ms, e(x) λx.t, e, ms, k ⇒ eval k, ms, [x, t, e] t 0 t 1 , e, ms, k ⇒ eval t 0 , e, m empty :: ms, arg(t 1 , e, k) R[t], e, m :: ms, k ⇒ eval t, e, m[R → no] :: ms, k grant R in t, e, m :: ms, k ⇒ eval t, e, m[R → grant] :: ms, k test R then t 0 else t 1 , e, ms, k ⇒ eval t 0 , e, ms, k if OK[R][ms] test R then t 0 else t 1 , e, ms, k ⇒ eval t 1 , e, ms, k otherwise fail, e, ms, k ⇒ final fail arg(t, e, k), m :: ms, v ⇒ cont t, e, m empty ::
As we have already observed in previous work [2, 6, 9, 11, 12] , the evaluation contexts, together with the cont transition function, are the defunctionalized counterpart of a continuation. We can therefore "refunctionalize" this continuation and then write the evaluator in direct style. The resulting evaluator threads a state-the stack of permission tables-and evaluation can fail. The evaluator can therefore be expressed as an instance of the monadic evaluator with a lifted state monad.
In the lifted state monad for stack inspection, the storable values are permission tables, and the state is a stack of storable values. The operations on the permission tables are expressed as the monadic operations push empty, pop top, mark complement no, mark grant, and OK. Furthermore, the monadic operation fail terminates the computation with a security error. The stack-inspection state monad is implemented as a structure with the following signature: The monadic evaluator corresponding to the unzipped version of the CM machine reads as follows:
datatype value = FUN of value -> value monad (* eval : term * value Env.env -> value monad *) fun eval (LAM (x, t), e) = unit (FUN (fn v => eval (t, Env.extend (x, v, e)))) | eval (VAR x, e) = unit (Env.lookup (e, x)) | eval (APP (t0, t1), e) = bind (push_empty, fn () => bind (eval (t0, e), fn v0 => bind (pop_top, fn () => bind (push_empty, fn () => bind (eval (t1, e), fn v1 => bind (pop_top, fn () => let val (FUN f) = v0 in f v1 end)))))) | eval (FRAME (R, t), e) = bind (mark_complement_no R, fn () => eval (t, e)) | eval (GRANT (R, t), e) = bind (mark_grant R, fn () => eval (t, e)) | eval (TEST (R, t0, t1 ), e) = bind (OK R, fn b => if b then eval (t0, e) else eval (t1, e)) | eval (FAIL, e) = fail
The process is reversible. Starting from this lifted state monad where the state is a stack of permission tables and this monadic evaluator, it is a simple exercise to reconstruct the unzipped CM machine by inlining the monad, closure converting the expressible values, CPS-transforming the evaluator, optimizing the continuation as illustrated in Appendix A to stop immediately in case of failure, and defunctionalizing the resulting continuations. In addition, we are now in position to combine properly tail-recursive stack inspection with other effects by combining the stackinspection monad with other monads at the monadic level. Inlining such combined monads lets us derive abstract machines with properly tail-recursive stack inspection and other computational effects [3] .
To summarize, we have shown that Clements and Felleisen's properly tail-recursive stack inspection can be expressed as a lifted state monad. Constructing abstract machines for a language with stack inspection and other effects expressed as monads therefore reduces to designing the desired combination of the monads and then mechanically deriving the corresponding abstract machine. The correctness of this abstract machine is a corollary of the correctness of the original monadic evaluator and of the transformations.
A dedicated monad for stack inspection
We observe that the lifted state monad is overly general to characterize the computational behaviour of stack inspection:
type 'a monad = permission_table list -> ('a * permission_table list) lift This type would also fit if all permissions in the stack were updatable. However, that is not the case-only the top permission table can be modified, and the other permission tables in the stack are read-only.
Instead, we can cache the top permission table and make it both readable and writable while keeping the rest of the stack read only. The corresponding type constructor reads as follows:
type 'a monad = permission_table * permission_table list -> ('a * permission_table) lift Proposition 2. The type constructor above, together with the following definitions of unit and bind, satisfies the three monadic laws. Proof. By straightforward equational reasoning.
This monad provides a more accurate characterization of stack inspection than the one in Section 6.
As an exercise, we have constructed the corresponding abstract machine which is similar to the one in Section 6.
Related work
Stack inspection is used as a fine-grained access control mechanism for Java [21] . It allows code with different levels of trust to safely interact in the same execution environment. Before access to a restricted resource is allowed, the entire call stack is inspected to test that the required permissions are available. Wallach, Appel, and Felten present a semantics for stack inspection based on a belief logic [34] . Their semantics is not tied to inspecting stack frames, and it is thus compatible with tail-call optimization. Their implementation, called security-passing style, allows them to implement stack inspection for Java without changing the JVM. Instead, they perform a global byte-code rewriting before loading. Fournet and Gordon develop a formal semantics and an equational theory for a λ-calculus model of stack inspection [19] . They use this equational theory to formally investigate how stack inspection affects known program transformations such as inlining and tail-call optimization. Clements and Felleisen present a properly tail-call optimized semantics for stack inspection based on Fournet and Gordon's semantics [7] . This tail-call optimized semantics is given in the form of a CESK machine, which was the starting point for our work.
Since Moggi's breakthrough [27] , monads have been widely used to parameterize functional programs with effects [5, 33] . We are not aware, though, of the use of monads in connection with abstract machines for computational effects.
For several decades abstract machines have been an active area of research, ranging from Landin's classical SECD machine [24] to the modern JVM [25] . As observed by Diehl, Hartel, and Sestoft [14] , research on abstract machines has chiefly focused on developing new machines and proving them correct. The thrust of our work is to explore a correspondence between interpreters and abstract machines [2, 4, 6, 9] that takes its roots in Reynolds seminal work on definitional interpreters [30] .
The present work is a next step of our study of this correspondence. Essentially the same correspondence has been put to use by Graunke, Findler, Krishnamurthi, and Felleisen to transform functional programs into abstract machines for programming the web [22] . The only difference is that Graunke, Findler, Krishnamurthi, and Felleisen use lambda-lifting instead of closure conversion. They do not need closure conversion because they do not consider evaluators for higher-order programming languages, and we do not need lambda-lifting because our evaluators are already lambda-lifted [13, 23] .
Conclusion
We have extended our correspondence between evaluators and abstract machines from the pure setting of the λ-calculus to the impure setting of the computational λ-calculus. Throughout, we have advocated that a viable alternative to designing abstract machines for languages with computational effects and then proving their correctness is to start from a monadic evaluator and a computational monad and to derive the corresponding abstract machine. We have illustrated this alternative with standard monads as well as with new monads. The identity monad leads us to the classical CEK machine. The lifted state monad leads us to a variant of the CEK machine with error and state. We have also characterized Clements and Felleisen's properly tail-recursive stack inspection as a lifted state monad which enables us to combine it with other monads and construct new abstract machines with properly tail-recursive stack inspection and other computational effects.
The contributions of this article are therefore as follows:
-a systematic construction of abstract machines for languages with computational effects from a monadic evaluator and a computational monad; -concrete examples of the construction for the identity monad and a lifted state monad; -a characterization of Clements and Felleisen's properly tail-recursive stack inspection as a lifted state monad and a reconstruction of the CM machine; and -a dedicated monad for properly tail-recursive stack inspection and the construction of a corresponding abstract machine.
Constructing abstract machines for languages with effects is known to be a challenge, one that is handled on a case-by-case basis. Our correspondence between evaluators and abstract machines provides a methodology to construct abstract machines for languages with effects. In addition, our characterization of stack inspection as a monad makes it possible to combine stack inspection with computational effects at a monadic level. We are therefore in position to construct, e.g., a variant of Krivine's machine with stack inspection as well as variants of the Categorical Abstract Machine and of the SECD machine with arbitrary computational effects expressed as monads.
